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THE NATURE OF PICTORIAL 
REPRESENTATIONS*
abstract
A crucial question in the study of picture perception asks about whether, when perceiving an object in 
a picture, we see only the depicted scene or, rather, we simultaneously see both the depicted scene and 
the surface. Two different views have fueled the debate since a long time. According to Wollheim, we see 
both the depicted scene and the picture’s surface simultaneously. Call this the ‘simultaneous account 
of picture perception’ (SA). SA is in contrast with Gombrich’s view that, during picture perception, we 
do not simultaneously see both the depicted scene and the surface, but we alternate between these two 
visual states. Call this the ‘non-simultaneous account of picture perception’ (NA). The debate between 
these two positions still persists in the contemporary literature on picture perception. In this paper, I first 
analyze the notion of vision SA and NA are committed to. Then, by discussing empirical evidence from 
vision science, I offer an argument that supports SA.
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THE NATURE OF PICTORIAL REPRESENTATIONS
You are looking at the wonderful ‘Calling of Saint Matthew’ by Caravaggio. The painting is 
very inspiring and you are intensely focusing on the wonderful depicted scene. Here is a 
question: are you visually representing only the depicted scene or, rather, are you also visually 
representing the picture’s surface?
This is a crucial question for the study of picture perception (Nanay, 2017) and “much of 
the philosophical literature on picture perception is about how these two perceptual states 
are related to each other” (Nanay, 2012, p. 440). Two different views have fueled the debate 
since a long time. For Wollheim, when a subject perceives an object in a picture (what 
is called ‘seeing-in’), she/he is in a peculiar visual state of ‘twofoldness’: she/he “is, and 
remains, visually aware not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the 
representation” (1980, pp. 214–215; 1998; 1987; see also Lopes, 2005; Nanay, 2011). Call this the 
‘simultaneous account of picture perception’ (henceforth: SA). SA is in contrast with the idea 
proposed by Gombrich (1960) that, during picture perception (or, following the terminology 
proposed by Wollheim, during seeing-in) we cannot see both the picture’s surface/vehicle 
and the depicted object at the same time: “is it possible to ‘see’ both the plane surface and the 
battle horse at the same time? (…) the demand is for the impossible. To understand the battle 
horse is for a moment to disregard the plane surface. We cannot have it both ways” (Ibid., 
p. 279). This view suggests that our visual system can only alternate between the picture’s 
surface and the depicted object. Call this the ‘non-simultaneous account of picture perception’ 
(henceforth: NA). 
Clearly, “Gombrich’s account of our experience of pictures is inconsistent with the idea 
of twofoldness” (Nanay 2011, p. 462, footnote 2). Indeed, “Gombrich held that seeing-in 
precludes, while Wollheim held it requires, seeing a picture’s design properties (i.e. those 
properties of the picture’s surface in virtue of which seeing-in is elicited)” (Cavedon-Taylor, 
2011). Note that both philosophical positions hold that seeing-in involves the occurrence of 
two visual operations: the perception of the picture’s surface and the perception of the depicted 
object. The debate is about whether these two visual operations occur simultaneously or, rather, 
are disjointed visual phenomena. 
The dichotomy between these two positions still persists in the contemporary literature on 
picture perception (Newall, 2011; Lopes, 2005; Kulvicki, 2006; Ferretti, 2017b; Hopkins, 2003; 
Nanay, 2017; Chasid, 2014; Nanay, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2017 for a review). Indeed, “the nature of 
seeing-in is a matter of controversy” (Cavedon-Taylor, 2011, p. 1). Thus, we still need a final 




First, I analyze SA and NA and the notion of vision they are committed to (§2). Then, I offer an 
argument that supports SA. This argument grounds on empirical evidence from vision science 
(§3).
Before developing my account, I need to discuss the specific ideas at the basis of NA and SA. 
We can start from SA.
Nanay has suggested (2011, p. 463) that Wollheim’s idea about seeing-in that, during picture 
perception, a subject “is, and remains, visually aware not only of what is represented but also 
of the surface qualities of the representation” (1980, pp. 214–215) can be interpreted in two 
different ways:
• SA1) We consciously see, (or consciously visually attend to)1 both the depicted object and some 
of the properties of the surface.
• SA2) We visually represent (or see) both the depicted object and some of the properties of 
the surface (while we may or may not attend to the surface). 
It seems that we should select SA2 (contra SA1) for different reasons (Nanay, 2011, 2017). 
First, empirical evidence shows that we can see “objects in pictures even if we are not 
conscious of either the surface or the depicted object” (Nanay 2011, footnote 1). Thus, the 
idea that we need to be conscious of both the picture’s surface and the depicted object during 
picture perception goes against the evidence above reported, i.e. about the possibility of 
the unconscious perception of objects in a picture in those cases in which we unconsciously 
perceive either the surface or the depicted object. Second, following Levinson (1998), Nanay 
(2011, p. 463; see also Lopes, 1996) suggests that, most of the time, during picture perception, 
our visual consciousness ignores the picture’s surface. Accordingly, following Lopes (2005, p. 
28), it is true that we see the surface when we see something visually encoded in it, but this 
does not entail that we consciously see the design as a design (see Nanay 2011, p. 464). Thus, 
the scenario described by SA1 is not necessary in order to enter pictorial experience (Id.; 
Lopes, 2005). Those who endorse SA2 also specify that, in picture perception, we consciously 
see the depicted object while unconsciously seeing the surface (for a review see Nanay, 2010, 
2011, 2017). That said, while someone suggested that SA1 is a condition not needed to enter 
pictorial experience, but can be realized in special cases (Ibid.), someone else suggested that 
the scenario described by SA1 is not possible. Here is the reason. If both the surface and 
the depicted object were simultaneously part of our visual phenomenological experience, 
pictorial experience would lead us to a very odd perceptual situation (Hopkins, 2012; Nanay, 
2017): since the pictorial space and the real space have a different nature, we would enter 
a disjointed visual experience concerning the different spatial qualities of the surface and 
of the depicted object. For these reasons, “if we are simultaneously attending to both the 
depicted scene and the picture’s surface, then there seems to be something contradictory 
or disjoint about our simultaneous experience of both of these. But, crucially, this objection 
does not apply if pictorial twofoldness2 is understood not as simultaneous attention, but as 
simultaneous (conscious or unconscious) representations” (Nanay, 2015, 192). I want to bypass 
here the debate about whether, in normal picture perception, we do not consciously need 
1  I use the notions of ‘conscious vision’ and ‘conscious visual attention’ interchangeably. I do not take part on the 
debate on their relation (Wu, 2014; Prinz, 2012) when talking about picture perception. This move is not controversial 
(see Nanay, 2011, 2017).
2  In his (2015) Nanay uses the notions of ‘seeing-in’ and ‘twofoldness’ interchangeably, while in his (2011) he 
distinguishes between them. Here I use them interchangeably. However, while ‘seeing-in’ might usually denote SA2, 
‘twofoldness’ might usually denote SA1.
2. The Nature of 
Seeing-In
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to visually represent both the surface and the depiction simultaneously or, rather, we can’t 
consciously visually represent both of them simultaneously. I simply follow SA2 in saying that, 
in ordinary picture perception, we consciously see the depicted object while unconsciously 
seeing the surface.3
All I am saying seems to suggest that SA2 is the best candidate for the notion of seeing-in: 
during seeing-in, we visually represent both the depicted object and the picture’s surface. The 
simultaneity defended by SA2 is about the presence of two (conscious or unconscious) visual 
states respectively attuned to the picture’s surface and to the depicted object. Thus, endorsing 
this notion of simultaneity does not entail endorsing the idea that we consciously see both of 
them, as suggested by SA1: we need to simultaneously see both of them (SA2), but we do not need 
to simultaneously consciously see (or visually attend to) both of them (as suggested by SA1). This 
notion perfectly explains how endorsing SA2 rules out the necessity of reaching the perceptual 
scenario described by SA1 in order to enter picture perception – though we can remain open 
about whether SA1 is possible or not. In this respect, as explained, the idea maintained here 
is that we simultaneously consciously see the depicted object, while unconsciously seeing the 
surface (Nanay, 2011, 2017; Ferretti, 2017b).
Summing up, here SA is interpreted by following the notion of seeing-in offered by SA2. This 
notion is, as we saw, nowise related to the notion of seeing-in à la SA1.
We can now focus on NA. Differently from SA, NA suggests that we cannot ‘see’ (visually 
represent) both the picture’s surface and the depicted object at the same time (i.e. 
simultaneously). Crucially, the reader may note that, as for SA, even for NA there are 
two possible interpretations (though the literature mainly analyzed SA and its possible 
interpretations, see Nanay, 2017; Lopes, 2005; Chasid, 2014):
• NA1) We do not simultaneously ‘consciously see’ (or consciously visually attend to) both 
the depicted object and (to) some of the properties of the surface.
• NA2) We do not simultaneously ‘see’4 (or visually represent) both the depicted object and 
some of the properties of the surface.
SA1 is in evident contrast with NA1, while SA2 is in evident contrast with NA2. The 
disagreement between NA2 and SA2 is about the notion of simultaneous visual representation 
of both the depicted object and the picture’s surface. The disagreement between NA1 and SA1 
is about the notion of simultaneous conscious vision (and conscious attention) (see Nanay, 
2011, 2017 for this relation). In other words, for SA2 at the same time t, we can see both the 
picture’s surface and the depicted object. For NA2, either at time t1 we see the picture’s 
surface and at time t2 we see the depicted object, or viceversa, but we never see both of them 
simultaneously, i.e. within the same time interval. Conversely, for SA1 at the same time t we 
can consciously see both the picture’s surface and the depicted object. For NA1, either at time 
t1 we consciously see the picture’s surface and at time t2 we consciously see the depicted object, 
or viceversa, but we never consciously see both of them simultaneously, i.e. within the same 
time interval. Note that NA2 suggests that neither SA1 nor SA2 are the case (see the passage 
by Gombrich in (§ 1)): neither can we consciously see, simultaneously, both the surface and 
the depiction, nor can we see, simultaneously, (consciously or unconsciously) both of them. 
SA2 and NA1 are perfectly compatible: NA1 follows the idea, also endorsed by some of those 
3  Note that even Nanay, who initially suggested the possibility of consciously perceiving both the surface and the 
depiction (2010, 2011), has recently followed the argument by Hopkins (2012) against the possibility of reaching this 
perceptual scenario in usual picture perception. However, this possibility is maintained by Nanay (2017) in relation to 
the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. I do not focus on this aspect of picture perception here.
4  Here ‘seeing’ might be conscious or unconscious, in line with SA2.
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who defend SA2, that SA1 is not possible: we can’t simultaneously consciously see both the 
surface and the depiction. Thus, for SA1, we can only alternate our visual consciousness 
between them.
It has been suggested that this paper follows SA2. Thus, it rejects the idea that SA1 is 
necessary for seeing-in – remember that here I bypass the debate about whether SA1 can 
be realized. Note also that NA2 is the notion usually mentioned when talking about NA – 
cfr. with the quote by Gombrich reported at the beginning of the paper in order to mainly 
characterize NA.5 As Nanay (2017) suggests, there are two main views in picture perception: 
one according to which “we see both the picture’s surface and the depicted object but we 
alternate between seeing the surface and seeing the depicted object” (Sect. 1) and another one 
according to which “we see both the picture’s surface and the depicted object and we see them 
simultaneously” (Ibid.). The first option “is normally attributed (rightly or wrongly) to Ernst 
Gombrich.6 His account of picture perception is that we ‘see’ both the surface and the depicted 
object, but we never ‘see’ the two at the same time. We oscillate between seeing the canvas 
and seeing the depicted scene” (Ibid.). This is the notion described by NA2. The second option 
is “the most widely discussed way of thinking about picture perception” (Ibid.) and is often 
attributed to Wollheim. According to this second option “when we see something in a picture 
we have a twofold perceptual state: we see the surface and the depicted object simultaneously” 
(Ibid.). This is the notion described by SA2. 
So, when focusing on the dichotomy between SA and NA, this paper refers to the specific 
dichotomy between NA2 and SA2. The next section reports the argument, based on empirical 
evidence from vision science, in favor of SA2 and against NA2. In order to defend SA2, I need to 
show that we always ‘see’ (visually represent, consciously or unconsciously) both the picture’s 
surface and the depicted object. 
This paper defends SA2, namely, the view that, during picture perception, we do ‘see’ – or 
visually represent – simultaneously both the picture’s surface and the depicted object: our 
visual brain simultaneously builds a visual representation of the picture’s surface and a 
visual representation of the depicted object. Furthermore, the former representation is 
usually unconscious, whereas the latter is usually conscious (§ 2). In order to defend SA2, it is 
sufficient to effectively show that we (the different activities of our visual system) do indeed 
build these two visual representations during picture perception or, in other words, that 
we see both the picture’s surface and the depicted object – though the representation of the 
picture’s surface does not need to be conscious.
It has been clearly shown, by vision science, that when we do not visually represent both 
the depicted object and the surface, but only the depicted object, without (the possibility of) 
visually representing the picture’s surface, the depicted object is able to foster in us the visual 
feeling of presence (Vishwanath, 2014; see also Ferretti, 2016b, 2017b); that is, it looks like a 
real, present object we can interact with, as in the case of the famous trompe l’oeil pictures; see 
below. Conversely, when we do not represent the depicted object as present, we are visually 
representing the surface. In this respect, we also know that normal pictures do not, in normal 
conditions, foster in us the visual feeling of presence: what we see is a depicted object, not a 
normal, present object (Ferretti, 2016b). Therefore, if when we do not see the picture’s surface 
the depicted object looks real and present, if, when the depicted object does not look real and 
present, that means that we see the surface, and if in normal conditions, the depicted object is 
5  For a more complex analysis of Gombrich’s position see (Hopkins, 2012; Briscoe, forthcoming).
6  See footnote 5.
3. Vision and SA 
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seen as such, and not as a normal, present object we can interact with, then, in normal/usual 
picture perception, we always see also the surface.
Now, saying that, in normal conditions, the depicted object is seen as such, and not as a normal, 
present object is an uncontroversial visual phenomenological evidence concerning ordinary 
picture perception (Nanay, 2017; Lopes, 2005; Matthen, 2005; Voltolini, 2013; Ferretti, 2016a, 
2016b, 2017a, 2017b; someone suggested that the depicted object is present as absent, Noë, 2012). 
If so, in order to defend SA2, I just need to show that when we do not see the picture’s surface, 
the depicted object looks real and present and that, thus, when the depicted object does not 
look present, we are seeing the surface. 
Experimental results seem to support this point. When a depicted scene is viewed with one eye 
(i.e., monocularly) through an oval aperture that occludes the rectangular boundary/frame of 
the image, the depicted object is indeed visually perceived as a present object we can interact 
with (Vishwanath and Hibbard, 2013, p. 1674; Vishwanath, 2014, p. 153). This evidence is also 
supported from both the psychophysical and the phenomenological point of view (Vishwanath, 
2014, pp. 174, 224, 225; Vishwanath and Hibbard, 2010, 2013; Ferretti, 2016b, 2.4; forthcoming). 
Therefore, when the surface is not visible, even depicted objects can look present to the 
observer (Vishwanath, 2014; Ferretti, 2016c, 2017b):
When a picture is viewed normally with both eyes, the picture’s surface is visible 
because of cues such as binocular disparity and the visible frame of the picture (…). 
Distance cues such as binocular convergence, vertical disparity, and the accommodative 
state of the lens specify the distance of this visible picture surface (…) rather than the 
pictorial contents (…). There are no known optical cues that specify the distance of 
pictorial objects from the observer. Therefore, under binocular viewing of pictures, 
although 3-D object shapes can be clearly perceived, their scale and absolute depth 
should remain optically unspecified. Monocular aperture viewing removes the main 
cues that specify the presence of the picture surface (binocular disparity and the visible 
frame), as well as binocular cues specifying its distance (convergence and vertical 
disparity). However, subsidiary distance cues, such as the accommodation state of the 
lens, are still present. In the absence of visible picture surfaces, it is plausible that the 
brain attributes the accommodation response to the pictorial objects, and assigns any 
associated distance information to them, allowing absolute depth values7 to be derived 
(...) (Vishwanath and Hibbard, 2013, pp. 1682-1683). 
This evidence suggests that we do not visually represent, during picture perception, the 
depicted object as present, because the visibility of the surface avoids the possibility of 
reaching this feeling: our visual representation of the picture’s vehicle/surface as present 
hinders (the possibility of visually representing) the visual feeling of presence of the depicted 
object (Vishwanath, 2014, p. 164; Ferretti, 2016c, 2.2, 2017b, forthcoming). Conversely, when 
there is no visual representation of the surface, the depicted object looks present. Thus, this 
evidence also suggests that, when we visually represent the surface, the depicted object 
cannot be perceived as present and, thus, that when it is perceived as present, we are not 
visually representing the surface.
Therefore, since in everyday life, during picture perception, we can always visually represent 
the picture’s surface, we do not visually represent the depicted object as present. All this 
7  Egocentric absolute depth concerns the fact that the “observer has knowledge of the depth relations scaled in some 
meaningful way to her/his actions” (Vishwanath 2011: 222, 206).
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suggests that the temporal relation between the perception of the surface/vehicle and 
the perception of the depicted object is crucial for ordinary (that is, non-illusory) picture 
perception (see below). These two perceptual states must occur simultaneously.            
However, there are situations in which we deal with a picture, but we are fooled that the 
depicted object is a real, present one. Following the evidence above reported, it seems that, 
in these situations, we cannot visually represent the picture’s surface. An example is trompe 
l’oeil seeing-in, in which the painting is skillfully realized in such a way that (even in binocular 
conditions and without oval apertures to see through) the visual system of the observer 
cannot properly detect (or ‘find’) the picture’s surface and is, thus, fooled by the illusory 
presence of very enhanced visual depth cues related to the depicted object. In this case, 
even if for a moment, we cannot rely on any visual representation of the surface. Thus, the 
depicted object perfectly looks as a present one we can interact with (Ferretti 2016b, 2017b, 
forthcoming; Nanay, 2015).
Here is an important point suggesting that we do not represent (consciously or unconsciously) 
the surface when perceiving trompe l’oeil. In the literature it is claimed that, during picture 
perception, we simultaneously unconsciously see the surface while consciously seeing the 
depicted object. Empirical evidence from vision science suggests that if we do not represent 
the surface, we enter into the illusion that what is a pictorial object looks like a real and 
present object we can interact with and that, thus, when we do not enter such an illusion, we 
are seeing the surface. But it also suggests that when we see the surface, we are not visually 
fooled that the depicted object is present and, thus, that when we are fooled that the depicted 
object is present, we do not see the surface. If so, while the representation of the surface is 
unconscious during normal picture perception, in the perception of trompe l’oeil we cannot 
rely on any visual representation of the surface. If also in trompe l’oeil perception we were 
having an unconscious representation of the surface, we could not distinguish between 
normal and trompe l’oeil picture perception: both, indeed, would involve an unconscious 
representation of the surface and a conscious representation of the depiction. Also, this would 
go against the literature on vision science that suggests that representing the surface allows 
avoiding the impression of presence of the depiction. This evidence suggests that if we are 
representing the surface (even if unconsciously), we can’t have a feeling of presence of the 
depicted object. Only when we cannot rely on such a visual representation we can enter such a 
feeling (for a complete analysis of this argument concerning the perception of trompe l’oeil see 
Ferretti 2016b, 2017c, forthcoming).
Here is another important point. Though I bypass the debate about the possibility of reaching 
the scenario described by SA1, here I endorse that we can consciously perceive the surface 
once we do not consciously perceive the depicted object anymore (at this point, we might 
perceive the depicted object, of course, unconsciously) – this indeed does not constitute a 
problem for my point. In this respect, note that with trompe l’oeil pictures we cannot even 
shift our conscious vision (or, one may say, our conscious visual attention) to the surface 
because we have no visual representation (either conscious or unconscious) of it. Having 
this visual representation, even unconscious, of the surface is what allows us, with normal 
pictures, to remain consciously visually interested and focused on the depicted object, without 
experiencing any visual feeling of presence of it, but with the possibility of shifting our 
conscious vision (or, one may say, our conscious visual attention) even to the surface – and, 
as explained, at this point the depicted object is not consciously perceived anymore. All this 
further suggests that the visual representation of the surface needed in order not to be fooled 
that the depicted object is present is of an unconscious nature. 
Summing up, first, according to the literature, we consciously see only the depicted object 
and we visually ignore, from the point of view of conscious visual experience and attention, 
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the surface, as suggested by those who defend SA2 – this holds independently of whether SA1 
can be realized or not (§1). Second, we need to build a visual representation of the surface, 
or we fall into the visual feeling of presence of the depicted object. These two perceptual 
facts are explained only by suggesting that, in picture perception, we have a conscious visual 
representation of the depicted object and an unconscious visual representation of the picture’s 
surface and that the possibility of relying on this unconscious representation concerning the 
presence of the surface allows us to be consciously focused on the depicted object, without 
having any illusory impression of presence of the depicted object. However, as anticipated a 
few lines above, there is the additional possibility of shifting our conscious attention to the 
picture’s surface, which is, then, consciously seen (visually represented) – while, at this point, 
the depicted object is not consciously seen anymore. This representational shift is perfectly 
compatible with SA2, independently of whether we claim that SA1 can be realized or not (§1). 
Indeed, following SA2 and contra NA2, we visually represent (or see) both the depicted object 
and the picture’s surface – and, in particular, we consciously see the depicted object while 
unconsciously seeing the surface. But we can also alternate between our conscious visual 
(attentive) states related, respectively, to the surface and to the depicted object. This is neither 
in contrast with SA2, nor with NA1. NA1 endorses that we alternate our conscious vision, 
which is endorsed also by SA2.8 To this extent, remember that SA2 and NA1 are perfectly 
compatible: NA1 follows the idea, also endorsed by some of those who defend SA2, that SA1 is 
not possible (§2): we can’t simultaneously consciously see both the surface and the depiction. 
Thus, for SA1, we can only alternate our visual consciousness between them (§2).
To conclude, we saw that when appropriate experimental settings make the picture’s surface 
invisible, the depicted object looks present. This can also happen with trompe l’oeil perception. 
Therefore, if in usual pictorial experience the depicted object does not look present when 
we consciously see it, then, we are also seeing (or visually representing) the surface (as 
present) unconsciously (Ferretti 2016b, 2017b, forthcoming). This is in line with the notion of 
simultaneity defended in the literature (§2). This is clearly sufficient in order to defend SA2. 
Thus, contra NA2, the best philosophical theory of seeing-in is SA2: during everyday (non trompe 
l’oeil) picture perception, we consciously visually represent the depicted object and we cannot 
avoid visually unconsciously representing the presence of a surface. This is the crucial visual 
condition in order to correctly enter ordinary (i.e. non-trompe l’oeil) picture perception.
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